This expensive business of keeping people poor

There is a question Ontario rarely asks about poverty. It is not whether we can afford to raise Ontario Works, whether food banks need more money, whether municipalities need another homelessness program, or whether employment services need better case management. The more fundamental question is this:

How long can Ontario afford to maintain a system in which inadequate primary income support continually creates demand for secondary systems to manage the consequences?

We have become remarkably inventive at treating the symptoms of inadequate income while remaining strangely incurious about the cost of creating those symptoms.

Consider Ontario Works. A single person can receive a maximum of $733 a month for basic needs and shelter, an amount that has not increased since 2018. Try living on it. Then watch what happens. The person cannot afford enough food, so we build a food-bank system. They cannot afford market rent, so we build homelessness-prevention programs, rent banks, shelters and supportive housing programs. They have difficulty getting to appointments or work, so we create transportation benefits. Their health deteriorates and the health system responds.

If they become homeless, shelters, outreach workers, paramedics, police and hospitals respond. If they have difficulty finding employment, another system assesses their barriers, develops an action plan, refers them to an employment-service provider and monitors their progress.

None of these services are unnecessary. Quite the opposite. Once someone is hungry, homeless, ill or in crisis, they may be desperately necessary. But there is something peculiar about the sequence. We save money at the front door and spend it at every other door.

Ontario’s food banks now serve more than a million individual people a year, with millions of visits. Ontario Works and disability benefits are the primary income sources for a large proportion of those using them. Think for a moment about what that means. Government provides an income. The income is insufficient to purchase food. A charitable sector must then raise money, recruit volunteers, solicit food, warehouse it, transport it, sort it and distribute it so that the recipient of the government income can eat.

We call the first expenditure social assistance and the second charity, as though they have little to do with one another. Economically, they are parts of the same system. If Ontario knowingly sets primary assistance below the cost of subsistence, somebody has to make up at least some of the difference. The need does not disappear because it has disappeared from the provincial budget. A loonie is agnostic as to who spends it.

This is how poverty becomes pixelated. The original problem may be quite simple: not enough money. But after passing through our institutions, it breaks into dozens of smaller problems—food insecurity, housing instability, homelessness, employability, mental health, transportation barriers, financial literacy, social isolation and crisis intervention. Each develops its own programs, professionals, funding streams, eligibility criteria, application forms, performance indicators, conferences, consultations and strategic plans.

Eventually we can be spending an extraordinary amount of money around a poor person without ever giving very much money to the poor person.

There is an additional problem. Because every organization can demonstrate that it delivered its particular service, the system can look remarkably successful. The food bank distributed more food. The employment agency completed more action plans. The shelter provided more beds. The hospital treated more patients. The homelessness program made more referrals. Everybody can meet their targets while the person remains poor.

That is one of the great accounting tricks of the modern poverty system. We measure the success of our responses without asking why demand for those responses keeps increasing.

A problem is best when avoided and second best when solved quickly. The most expensive version may be a problem that has to be managed indefinitely. Increasingly, Ontario manages poverty. Once insufficient income produces food insecurity, we require a food-security sector. Once housing instability becomes homelessness, we require an elaborate homelessness sector. Once people living on inadequate benefits encounter difficulty entering the workforce, we construct increasingly sophisticated employment-services systems around them.

Each response makes sense considered separately. Together they may make very little sense at all.

This is the difference between program logic and system logic. It can be perfectly rational for one ministry to hold down an expenditure, perfectly rational for a municipality to increase another expenditure in response, perfectly rational for a hospital to treat the resulting illness, and perfectly rational for a charity to feed the person afterward. But nobody adds up the whole chain.

The cost of a $733 Ontario Works payment is easy to calculate. The cost of a $733 Ontario Works payment that is inadequate is much harder to calculate.

There is another expense hidden inside this system: the cost of administering inadequacy. When governments provide very little money, they nevertheless become intensely interested in ensuring that nobody receives a dollar more than the rules permit. So, we supervise. We verify. We ask about earnings, assets, spouses, living arrangements and absences from Ontario. We reassess. We create overpayments and collect them. We build computer systems to conduct verification and case-management systems to document compliance. On the employment side we assess barriers, develop plans, make referrals and measure outcomes.

Some of this administration is obviously necessary. Public money requires accountability. But there comes a point at which we should ask an impolite question: How much does it cost to administer giving people too little money?

Ontario has already accepted an important principle with ODSP. Disability-support rates are now indexed to inflation. Ontario Works remains frozen. The difference is revealing. We apparently understand that allowing disability benefits continually to lose purchasing power is unsustainable, but have not applied the same logic to Ontario Works. Perhaps that is because OW continues to be imagined as temporary assistance on the way to employment. But temporary poverty still requires food and shelter. No landlord accepts an employment action plan in lieu of rent.

The conventional question is always: How much would it cost to raise benefits? It is a legitimate question, but it is only half an accounting exercise. The other half is: What are we spending because we didn’t?

How much shelter use? How many emergency-room visits? How much food-bank infrastructure? How much homelessness outreach and crisis intervention? How much municipal discretionary assistance? How much policing and paramedic response? How much charitable fundraising? How much case management? How much administration devoted to repeatedly identifying needs that everyone already knows cannot be met on the income provided?

And perhaps most importantly, how much human capacity is lost while people spend their days solving emergencies created by having too little money?

None of this means that adding a few hundred dollars to Ontario Works would eliminate food banks, hospitals, shelters or employment services. It plainly would not. Nor is every social problem reducible to income. But surely the burden of proof has become reversed. We have spent decades demanding rigorous evidence that giving poor people more money will improve outcomes. Perhaps it is time to demand equally rigorous evidence that giving them too little and purchasing the consequences elsewhere is cheaper.

That would require a different sort of public accounting. Start with the person rather than the Ministry. Add up the public and charitable expenditures generated around that person’s poverty over a year. Then compare different futures. What happens if primary income remains deeply inadequate? What happens if it rises modestly? What happens if earnings exemptions improve? What happens if affordable housing reduces the proportion of income swallowed by rent? Which secondary costs decline and which remain?

We might discover that adequate income costs more. If so, at least we would know. But we might discover something considerably more uncomfortable: Ontario has mistaken a cheap benefit for a cheap system.

They are not the same thing.

A government can save $100 on social assistance and cause another Ministry, municipality, hospital or charity to spend $200 dealing with what happens next. The provincial books faithfully record the $100 that was not spent. The $200 appears somewhere else, often in another government’s budget or outside government altogether. No single set of accounts records the transaction for what it really was.

This is why the enormous capacity Ontario has developed to respond to poverty should not be confused with a capacity to reduce it. Thousands of talented and compassionate people work every day in food banks, shelters, hospitals, municipalities, employment agencies and community organizations. Their work is essential. But the question is why we require so many of them to respond to conditions that might, at least partly, have been prevented upstream.

A food bank that serves twice as many people may have performed magnificently. It has not demonstrated that Ontario has reduced hunger. A shelter that finds beds for everyone tonight has succeeded at its task. It has not demonstrated that Ontario has reduced homelessness. An employment agency that completes every required assessment may have complied perfectly with its contract. It has not demonstrated that anyone has become less poor.

We need to stop confusing the successful management of consequences with the successful reduction of causes.

Ontario can probably maintain the present system for a very long time. Governments are exceptionally good at maintaining systems. The more interesting question is why we would want to. We have built an increasingly elaborate, professional and expensive infrastructure for helping people live with the consequences of not having enough money, while treating the possibility of giving them enough money as prohibitively expensive.

Before Ontario adds the next program, service, referral, assessment, verification process or layer of administration, it should undertake a much simpler exercise. Calculate the full cost of poverty. Calculate the full cost of managing it. Then calculate what it would cost to prevent some of it.

Only then will we know what we can afford.