The urgent need for policy archaeology

Why governments need to excavate their rules before they can reform them

Archaeologists dig because something has been lost.

Sometimes it is a civilization, sometimes a settlement, sometimes an ordinary object whose purpose has become mysterious. The object survives, but the people who made it, used it and understood it are gone.

The archaeologist’s job is not simply to recover the object. It is to work out why it existed, what problem it solved, how it was used and what it tells us about the people who created it. I went on a dig in southern Ontario between High school and university. We found items – we explained them and then tried to connect a lost understanding with today’s narratives.

With that experience, I have come to believe that governments need archaeologists too.

Not necessarily people with shovels, brushes and sieves, but people prepared to excavate the origins of public policies whose purposes have been forgotten, even while the policies themselves remain in force.

I call this policy archaeology, and I believe there is some urgency about it.

The mystery of the $109 rent

I have recently been examining the special rent scales that apply to people receiving Ontario Works and the Ontario Disability Support Program (ODSP) who live in rent-geared-to-income housing.

Under Ontario’s housing regulations, a single person receiving Ontario Works can pay a prescribed rent of $85 a month. A single person receiving ODSP can pay $109.

There is also a third column in the regulatory tables, containing what are called non-benefit income limits. For a single Ontario Works recipient, the amount is $360. For a single ODSP recipient, it is $440.

These figures are not new. They have survived through successive governments, housing reforms, changes in social assistance, changes in earnings exemptions and enormous increases in the cost of living.

They are still there, doing their work.

But why?

Why $85? Why $109? Why $360 and $440? Why do people receiving social assistance pay rents determined by special tables while other tenants generally pay rents based on income? And why does acquiring income from another source change which calculation applies?

I once knew people in government who could answer these questions. They understood the legislation, the financial arrangements and the negotiations that produced the rules. Some had been present when the decisions were made. Others had learned from those who had.

I no longer know anyone who can explain the whole story.

That does not mean nobody in government knows it. But I suspect that the number of people who understand how all these pieces fit together is now very small.

The regulations have survived their institutional memory.

History and archaeology are not quite the same thing

Historians will rightly object if I suggest that history is simply what we remember while archaeology is what we have forgotten. Historians spend much of their lives recovering forgotten evidence and challenging accounts of the past. Archaeologists also work with written records.

But there is a useful distinction for my purposes.

History can tell us that a law was passed in a particular year, that a government changed a program, or that responsibility for a service moved from one level of government to another.

Policy archaeology asks another set of questions.

What problem did the people making the rule believe they were solving? What alternatives did they reject? What assumptions did they make? What other rules did they expect to remain in place? And what happened when those assumptions ceased to be true?

The answers may not be in the legislation.

They may be in an old briefing note, a forgotten Cabinet submission, an administrative manual, a budget instruction, a legal opinion, or the recollection of someone who sat around the table.

Sometimes the explanation survives only in the arithmetic.

A number such as $440 may look arbitrary until someone discovers that it was connected to a $109 rent, a $75 deduction and a calculation based on 30% of income.

Suddenly the number has a history. We have found a piece of the machinery that produced it.

But finding the machinery is only the beginning. We then have to understand what it was intended to accomplish and whether that purpose still makes sense.

Seven things you need to know before changing the rent tables

Consider what an analyst would need to know to understand Ontario’s special social assistance rent scales.

First, there was the Canada Assistance Plan, or CAP, introduced in 1966. CAP established federal-provincial cost-sharing for social assistance based on a needs-tested approach to determining assistance. Basic requirements included food, clothing, shelter and other necessities. Ontario’s distinction between basic-needs and shelter allowances developed within this larger approach to assessing and financing need.

The distinction is crucial because shelter costs were treated differently from other living expenses. The amount of rent a person paid could affect the assistance they received.

Second, CAP ended as a system of cost-sharing in 1996, when the Canada Health and Social Transfer replaced it. The federal framework that had helped shape provincial welfare design disappeared, but the distinction between basic needs and shelter remained embedded in Ontario’s programs.

A major reason for maintaining the old structure had changed but the structure itself survived.

Third, public housing policy had developed its own approach to calculating rents. During the 1970s and 1980s, rent-geared-to-income arrangements increasingly reflected the principle that tenants should pay approximately 30% of their income toward rent.

But welfare recipients presented a special problem. Their income included a shelter allowance that could itself depend on the amount of rent they paid.

Fourth, this created what I have called the shelter spiral.

If a housing provider increased a tenant’s rent, the welfare system might increase the tenant’s shelter allowance. If the ‘housing provider’ then counted that increased allowance as income, the rent might increase again, producing another adjustment to the shelter allowance.

The two systems could chase each other around in circles.

Special welfare rent scales were a way to break that circle. Instead of calculating rent as a percentage of a shelter allowance that could change with rent, the housing provider used a prescribed amount.

The $85 and $109 rents are descendants of that solution.

Fifth, there was another problem. What happened when a welfare recipient started working and eventually earned enough to leave assistance?

If the tenant moved suddenly from the special welfare rent scale to the ordinary 30% calculation, the rent could jump dramatically. The non-benefit income thresholds, and the earlier transitional arrangements from which they developed, were intended to smooth that movement.

They were meant to prevent people from getting whomped by rent increases just as they were trying to become independent of social assistance.

This was not a foolish objective. It was an attempt to deal with a real problem caused by the interaction of two programs.

Sixth, Ontario began downloading social housing responsibilities to municipalities in the late 1990s, with the legislative and administrative framework developing through the Social Housing Reform Act, 2000.

The financial arrangements accompanying the transfer were concerned with which level of government would bear housing costs and receive revenues. The principle that municipalities should not receive an unintended financial windfall was part of the policy and fiscal context.

The implications for special welfare rents were considerable. A change in the rent scales could affect housing-provider revenue, municipal subsidy requirements and provincial social assistance expenditures.

A reform that looked straightforward from the perspective of a welfare recipient could look quite different from the perspective of a municipal finance department.

Seventh, the Housing Services Act, 2011 replaced the earlier social housing legislative framework, but it did not eliminate the special welfare rent scales. They were carried forward into the regulatory structure, where they remain today.

So here we are.

CAP is gone. The original housing financing arrangements have changed. Municipalities administer housing under a different framework. Social assistance earnings rules have been repeatedly revised. The relationship between wages, benefits and rents has changed enormously.

But the special rent scales and the non-benefit income thresholds are still there and in the exact same amounts.

To understand them properly, an analyst needs to know all seven parts of the story, and probably several more.

Knowing only the current regulation is not enough.

The danger of explaining a rule by quoting the rule

One of the peculiarities of modern administration is that we can become extremely good at explaining what a rule says without knowing why it says it.

Ask why a single ODSP recipient pays $109 in prescribed rent and someone may direct you to the regulation.

Ask why the non-benefit income threshold is $440 and you may be directed to Column 3 of Table 3.

Ask what happens when someone exceeds $440 and you may receive a detailed explanation of how the alternative rent calculation works.

All of this may be legally correct.

None of it answers the question.

The regulation is the evidence of the decision, not the explanation for the decision.

An archaeologist who discovered an ancient stone structure would not explain its existence by saying that the stones were arranged in accordance with the rules governing stone structures.

The archaeologist would want to know what the structure was for.

Yet in government, the ability to administer a rule can gradually become a substitute for understanding it. The danger is that we begin to treat inherited arrangements as necessary simply because they are familiar.

When the original solution becomes the problem

In my paper Zero Dollar Linda, I described how Linda Chamberlain, a woman receiving ODSP who found part-time employment, encountered the interaction between social assistance and housing rules.

As her earnings increased, ODSP reduced her benefits. Her housing provider also moved her from the special ODSP rent scale to the ordinary rent-geared-to-income calculation.

Her rent rose from $109 to $623.

The two programs were applying their respective rules, but the combined result undermined the financial advantage of working.

What makes Linda’s story especially revealing is that the non-benefit thresholds were originally intended to prevent precisely this kind of financial shock.

The protective arrangement had become part of the problem.

There is another revealing example involving CPP disability benefits.

A person receiving ODSP can also receive CPP-D, which generally reduces the income support portion of ODSP. Depending on the amount received, the person may remain eligible for ODSP and its associated benefits.

But CPP-D also counts as non-benefit income for housing purposes. Once the applicable threshold is exceeded, the special rent scale may cease to apply, even though the person remains on ODSP.

The person’s housing needs have not changed. Their disability has not changed. Their eligibility for disability assistance may not have changed.

What has changed is the calculation.

And this is why the archaeology matters. Without knowing why the special rents and thresholds were introduced, an analyst may see the resulting complications as unfortunate but unavoidable features of income-tested programs.

They are not unavoidable. They are the accumulated consequences of decisions made under different circumstances.

The ‘Roadmap’ and the reform that was waiting to happen

In 2017, Income Security: A Roadmap for Change proposed replacing Ontario’s separate basic-needs and shelter allowances with an adequate flat-rate benefit.

It also recommended eliminating the special social assistance rent scales and reinvesting the additional housing revenues arising from the change into housing and homelessness priorities.

This was more than a proposal to simplify administration. It offered a way to eliminate the original shelter spiral.

If income assistance no longer depended on the rent a person paid, there would be no need for a special rent scale to prevent the housing and welfare systems from repeatedly adjusting to each other.

And if there were no special rent scales, there would be no need for non-benefit income thresholds to determine when someone stopped qualifying for them.

Two layers of rules could disappear because the original problem had been addressed.

Of course, that reform would have to be designed carefully. Simply abolishing the special rent scales without increasing income support or providing transitional protection could leave low-income tenants facing substantial rent increases.

The ‘Roadmap’ was not an invitation to do that.

But it recognized something that is easy to miss when examining regulations one at a time: the most effective way to remove a troublesome rule may be to eliminate the problem that originally required it.

The ‘Roadmap’ did not need to preserve the $440 threshold or replace it with a better number. It proposed a structure in which the threshold would no longer be needed.

That is what genuine reform looks like.

Government has records. Does it have memory?

Governments preserve legislation, regulations, orders in council, budgets, policy manuals and countless other documents.

What they preserve much less successfully is the reasoning that connects them.

People retire. Ministries reorganize. Programs move between departments. Files are archived. Computer systems are replaced. Briefing notes are written for immediate decisions, not for future generations trying to understand them.

And institutional memory is rarely treated as a public asset that must be maintained.

We have elaborate arrangements for preserving financial records. We have retention schedules for documents. We have archives.

But do we have a reliable way to preserve the explanations for major policy choices?

Do we routinely record why one option was chosen over another, what assumptions supported the decision, and what future changes would make the arrangement obsolete?

Usually, not well enough.

This matters because the people responsible for reforming programs inherit not only their current rules but also their hidden dependencies.

A reform to housing rents may have consequences for social assistance. A change in social assistance may affect municipal housing finances. A rule introduced to comply with a federal cost-sharing arrangement may remain in place decades after that arrangement has disappeared.

Without an account of these relationships, governments risk making changes that solve one problem while recreating another.

Or, perhaps more commonly, they make no change at all.

The rule is complicated. Nobody is entirely sure why it exists. Changing it might have unintended consequences.

So, it stays.

Archaeological urgency

I use the word urgency deliberately.

There is a limited period during which the people who designed and administered older programs can still explain what happened.

Once they are gone, some of their knowledge may be unrecoverable.

The written record may tell us what was approved. It may not tell us why a particular amount was selected, why a proposal was rejected, what the negotiators feared, or what informal understandings made an arrangement workable.

Those details can be crucial.

In the case of Ontario’s welfare rent scales, I can still reconstruct much of the story because I worked in and around the system, knew some of the people involved and have retained documents that explain pieces of the puzzle.

But I am also conscious that my own knowledge is incomplete. Some of what I remember needs to be checked against the record. Some of what I once knew I have forgotten.

That is another reason for doing the work now.

Policy archaeology should not depend entirely on the recollections of former officials, however valuable those recollections may be. It should bring together legislation, administrative records, financial calculations, contemporary accounts and the memories of participants, testing each against the others.

The objective is not nostalgia. Nor is it to prove that earlier policymakers were wrong.

In many cases, they were responding intelligently to the problems they faced.

The objective is to understand their reasoning well enough to determine whether their solutions are still needed.

A policy that made sense in 1978 may make little sense in 2026. But unless we understand what made it sensible in 1978, we may never recognize why it has become unnecessary.

Before we reform, we must excavate

I would like to see governments undertake policy archaeology as a normal part of major program reviews.

Not simply a chronology of legislative amendments, but an account of the original problem, the reasons for the chosen solution, the assumptions behind it, the subsequent changes to related programs and the consequences of leaving the original rule in place.

In other words, every major review should ask not only what a program does today, but why it was designed to do it in the first place.

And it should identify the rules whose original purposes have disappeared.

That is not an argument against history. It is an argument for recovering the kind of history that can inform present decisions.

The past does not become irrelevant because the people who understood it have retired. On the contrary, their departure makes the work of reconstruction more important.

The special welfare rent scales and non-benefit thresholds in Ontario’s housing regulations are not ancient ruins. They are living rules affecting people today.

But they are also artifacts of a policy world that has largely disappeared.

We should not need an archaeological expedition to explain why a single ODSP recipient pays $109 in rent or why $440 in other income matters.

Yet here we are.

The urgency of policy archaeology is that governments cannot confidently dismantle what they no longer understand. And the longer they wait to recover the reasoning, the harder that understanding becomes.